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the state of the economic development, the survey pays attention to the effects of emigration on educational decisions. By 
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individuals face a minimum subsistence level which creates a liquidity constraint. If the standard of living of the developing 
country falls below the standard of living of the developed country, the liquidity constraint restricts the educational decisions. 
Therefore, poverty trap is still a possibility for extremely poor countries. According to the analysis, the best potential for brain 
drain to result in positive effects on the source country of emigration is for middle-income countries. 
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syntyy. Lisäksi kouluttautuneiden yksilöiden muuttomahdollisuuden on oltava tarpeeksi pieni. Yleiskatsauksen mukaan 
kouluttautuneiden työntekijöiden määrä ei myöskään saa jo olla korkea, koska silloin kannustinvaikutus ei toimi. Toisaalta 
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List of symbols 
 
  The share of physical capital in national income 
                     The relative efficiency of innovation compared to imitation in generating  
 productivity growth 
  The efficiency of the process of technological improvements 
                     The number of efficiency units offered by a high-skilled worker additional to  
                        those offered by a low-skilled worker 
                     The elasticity of unskilled labor in innovation                                                                                 
 A parameter describing time preference and relative length of the 
                       retirement period 
	                    The minimum subsistence level in period 
 
                    The proportion of educated of an economy in period 
 
  The elasticity of unskilled labor in imitation 
                    The risk premium factor in period 
 
                   The wage rate of a developing country relative to the wage rate of a 
                        developed country in period 
 
                    Total factor productivity in period 
 
,                 Total factor productivity of sector  in period 
 
                   The latent ability of an individual  to learn new skills 
                     The cost of education 
                     The amount of educated/skilled workers in an economy 
,,              The amount of educated/skilled labor used in imitation in sector  in period 
 
,,               The amount of educated/skilled labor used in innovation in sector  in period  
                        
                
                   Labor in efficiency units used in production in period 
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ℎ                    The average number of efficiency units of labor in period 
 
                   Physical capital used in production in period 
 
                    The stock of capital per worker in period 
 
  The amount of land used in production in period 
 
                    The average number of children  
                     The probability of migration for educated workers 
,  The price of an intermediate input  in period 
 
 ,  The flow of intermediate good  in period 
 
!∗                   The international interest factor in period 
 
#                    The net return to physical capital in period 
  
$                    Savings in period 
  
% The amount of uneducated/unskilled workers in an economy  
&,,              The amount of unskilled labor used in imitation in sector  in period 
 
&,,               The amount of unskilled labor used in innovation in sector  in period 
 
'                   The wage rate per efficiency units of labor in period 
 
'(,                 The wage rate of an educated worker in period 
 
'),                 The wage rate of an uneducated worker in period 
 
*                    The vector of country characteristics determining the wage rate in period 
 
+                    Education decision in period 
 (a dichotomous variable) 
,                    Gross domestic product in period 
/ a composite good produced in period 
 
-                    Gross domestic product per capita in period 
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1 Introduction 
 
During the last five decades the number of international migrants has been steadily 
increasing. Comparing the different development groups reveals that the developed 
countries have been net gainers of international migration, whereas the developing 
countries have been main sending countries of international emigrants. According to the 
United Nations (2007) between the years 1990 and 2000 the developed countries were 
gaining 2,5 million migrants annually. Hereby, there are more people living outside their 
home countries than never before and it seems like the increase in the amount of 
international migrants is not going to die down in the near future. Especially 
environmental disasters, demographic disparities, and deterioration of employment 
opportunities ensure that emigration out of the developing countries continues to 
dominate most likely. The report of International Organization for Migration (2010) 
predicts that if the number of international migrants continues to increase as quickly as 
during the last 20 years, the migrant population could reach the amount of 405 million by 
2050. 
 
The increase of migration causes challenges not only for the receiving developed 
countries but also for the developing countries. There is a lot of evidence that the share 
of high-skilled emigration has been increasing relative to the share of low-skilled 
emigration
1
.  Particularly, the amount of educated emigrants has grown in absolute 
terms. The departure of a nation´s most educated individuals is commonly referred to as 
brain drain. This term has been used especially when considering emigration flows from 
developing to developed countries
2
.  
 
The brain drain literature originated in the late 1960s. The first contributions did not find 
that brain drain would have any great influences on the welfare of those remaining in the 
source country. For example Grubel and Scott (1966) discovered that there are only some 
                                                      
1
 See for example Defoort (2008). 
2
 See for example Gibson and McKenzie (2011). 
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short run losses resulting from the emigration of the highly skilled. In the short run there 
are especially some adjustment costs caused by inefficient employment of new factors of 
production. Thus, the production losses only last until new replacements for inputs have 
been introduced and disappear in the long run. Of a greater importance are the long run 
effects on the welfare which are inflicted by failures to allocate resources efficiently on 
the free market. Grubel and Scott reported that also the losses of the long run tend to be 
negligible because governments are able to redistribute tax incomes and expenditures 
quite effortlessly. Furthermore, emigration of highly skilled individuals causes positive 
externalities through remittances and new knowledge produced by scientists in the 
destination countries. Hereby, Grubel and Scott actually supported the free movement of 
international migrants. 
 
A new understanding of brain drain was formed in the 1970s. For example Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974) challenged the previous studies by pointing out that because of 
externalities social marginal product normally exceeds private marginal product. They 
took into consideration three economic inefficiencies: two sticky wages for educated and 
uneducated workers and free education. Paying attention to the well observed fact that 
integrated markets for educated workers tend to create an increment in the wages of 
highly skilled individuals in the source country of emigration, they also took into account 
the leap-frogging process. The leap-frogging process signifies that as a consequence of 
the increasing wages of educated individuals, the wages of uneducated workers also tend 
to be pulled up.  Carrying out a welfare analysis, Bhagwati and Hamada concluded that 
brain drain causes unfavorable effects on the national income and on the employment of 
both educated and uneducated individuals. Along with Bhagwati and Hamada, many 
other authors of the 1970s found negative impacts of highly skilled emigration on 
economic development. For example McCulloch and Yellen (1977) examined the effects 
of policy-induced changes in factor earnings and discovered that policies aimed to assist 
less developed regions may actually result in undesirable influences such as 
overinvestment in education.  
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Even in the 1990s there was still a lot of support given for the stance suggesting that brain 
drain leads to harmful effects on national income and growth
3
. However, the 
understanding about the impacts of brain drain was slowly started to be questioned 
during the decade. The more recent analyses have seen brain drain to increase incentives 
to acquire education in addition to the new employment opportunities
4
. Thus, a 
possibility of emigration into a more advanced country with a higher wage rate produces 
an incentive effect. Models with this assumption have found certain circumstances which 
lead to brain gain instead of brain drain. An example of such a model was developed by 
Vidal in 1998. According to Vidal, emigration of educated individuals may result in 
bifurcation in the dynamics of an economy and hereby free some of the developing 
countries from poverty trap. Therefore, brain drain should not be condemned 
detrimental without a closer examination.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out whether there actually exists a possibility of 
beneficial brain drain. And if so, what are the conditions under which high-skilled 
emigration leads to brain gain instead of brain drain. The thesis will at first introduce a 
simple overlapping generations model of brain drain from the 1990s. The model will be 
derived in three stages in section 2. The production sector and the decision making of 
individuals will first be presented separately before concentrating on the effects of high-
skilled emigration on the productivity of an economy. Because the amount of human 
capital of the economy is considered as an essential determinant of economic growth
5
, 
the main focus is on how individuals decide whether to invest in education, and how the 
possibility of emigration affects the amount of educated individuals of the economy.   
 
The second overlapping generations model introduced in section 3 takes into 
consideration the possible equilibria determined by the production sector and decisions 
made by individuals of the economy. The production sector of the economy determines a 
wage-setting equation which can have either increasing or diminishing marginal returns 
                                                      
3
 See for example Miyagiwa (1991), Haque and Kim (1995), and Wong and Yip (1999). 
4
 See for example Stark et al. (1997), and Stark et al. (1998). 
5
 See for example Romer (1990). 
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with respect to the average level of human capital of the economy. Therefore, the 
properties of the wage-setting curve will be studied more closely in section 3.2 assuming 
that human capital affects the productivity growth through industries benefiting 
imitations and innovations. The behavior of utility maximizing individuals, on the other 
hand, determines a skill-setting equation which defines how the average level of human 
capital develops in an economy. By combining the wage-setting and the skill-setting 
equations in section 4, the equilibria of the model will be utilized to examine the 
dynamics caused by emigration of some of the highly skilled individuals of the economy 
and, hereby, to figure out the possible conditions for beneficial brain drain. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2 Overview of Brain Drain 
 
In order to examine the effects of brain drain on the growth of the source country of 
emigration, the first objective of the thesis is to analyze the impacts of emigration on 
educational decisions based on the paper written by Andrew Mountford in 1997. As 
shown by many empirical and theoretical studies
6
, the level of schooling is a significant 
explanatory variable for differing growth rates across countries. An essential assumption 
for the overview is that educational decisions are made endogenously, and thus 
individuals of the economy tend to acquire different levels of education. As a 
consequence, individuals are categorized into two different educational classes: the 
educated and the uneducated individuals, or alternatively the highly skilled and the low 
skilled individuals. Educated and highly skilled refer to individuals with a tertiary 
schooling. In addition, there is no certainty for the possibility of emigration. This 
illustrates the fact that there are some restrictions for emigration.  
 
                                                      
6
 See for example Mankiw et al. (1992), or Cohen and Soto (2007) for an empirical research, and Galor and 
Zeira (1993) for a theoretical approach. 
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We will first take a look at an economy where there does not exist a possibility of 
emigration. Firstly, the production side of the economy will be specified, and as a result 
the factor prices will be defined. Secondly, it will be examined how individuals make 
decisions concerning their level of education. It is assumed that abilities of the decision 
makers are distributed according to a certain distribution function. After the educational 
decisions have been studied in a closed economy, the possibility of emigration will be 
included into the analysis. The details of the calculations of the section are given in 
Appendix A.  
 
2.1 Production and Factor Prices  
 
In an economy of overlapping generations, one good is produced according to a constant 
returns to scale production function. Two factors of production, physical capital and 
efficiency units of labor, are utilized in the production. The total amount of physical 
capital available in period 
 is denoted by , while the total amount of efficiency units of 
labor in period 
 is denoted by . It is assumed that there exists a continuum of 
individuals in each period of time, but for simplicity the amount of individuals born in 
every period is normalized to unity. The state of the technology is depicted by   and the 
output produced in period 
 is thus described by the production function written as 
, = /0, 1. 
Because of the assumption of constant returns, the production function can be modified 
into intensive form
7
. Consequently, the production function can be rewritten as 
, = / 3 456575 , 19  
and by denoting :01 ≡ / 3 456575 , 19, the production function becomes 
, = :01,                                                        02.11 
where  = 456575 is the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor in period 
. The following  
                                                      
7
 See for example Romer (2001), pp. 10. 
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assumptions can be assumed to apply for the function : with all the values of : 
:01 > 0, 
:´01 > 0, 
:´´01 < 0, 
limD→F :01 = 0, 
limD→F :´01 = ∞ 
and 
limD→H:´01 = 0, 
where the last three assumptions are the Inada conditions. 
 
Supposing that perfect competition is prevailing in the economy, factor prices are 
determined by the marginal products of the factors. As a consequence, the net return to 
physical capital is given by 
# = IJ5I45 = :´01.                                                  02.21   
However, because of perfect mobility of capital the world net rate of return is a constant 
#∗, presupposing that the world is in a steady state equilibrium. As a result, also # is 
equal to #∗ and the amount of capital in efficiency units is thus a constant  in every 
period 
. Consequently, for a given level of technology the wage rate per efficiency unit of 
labor is determined by  as 
' = IJ5I75 = K:01 − :´01M = '01,                                   02.31    
where '01 ≡ :01 − :´01.  
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The production side of the economy and the factor prices have now been determined. 
Next it will be considered how individuals make educational decisions taking into account 
a cost of education and a latent ability typical for the individual. 
 
2.2 Education Decision  
 
It can be quite naturally assumed that individuals are not equally able to learn new skills. 
Due to these differences in latent abilities, each individual  of the economy possesses his 
own level of latent ability denoted by . The latent abilities of all the individuals are 
distributed over a closed interval K0, OM and follow a density function P01 which has the 
following properties: 
Q P01R = 1SF  
and 
P01 > 0, ∀	 ∈ K0, OM. 
It is assumed that the latent abilities of all the generations receive values from the 
interval K0, OM and, in addition, the latent abilities of children do not depend on the 
abilities of their parents
8
. 
 
Individuals of the economy are assumed to live for three periods and they derive utility 
only from their third period consumption. The utility function is chosen in this way in 
order to make the analysis as simple as possible. However, the same results can be 
obtained even though utility would depend on consumption of all the three periods
9
. 
During the first period individuals have a possibility to invest in education. The 
assumption of three periods is necessary because individuals borrow to fund their 
                                                      
8
 Mountford takes into account the dependence of a latent ability on the average level of “parental” human 
capital in his previous model derived in 1995. This assumption does not, however, affect the final 
conclusions. 
9
 This has been done in the paper of Mountford in 1995. In addition, the utility of individuals of the model 
derived in section 3 will depend on consumption of all the three periods of their lives. 
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education. In order to finance the education they borrow assets from the capital market 
at the world´s interest rate #∗. In the second period of their life, individuals work and 
repay the debt borrowed for education. The three period structure of the economy is 
required because the individuals who are repaid must be still alive.  
 
The cost of education, which is a fixed cost, is assumed to be  units of output. Those who 
invest in education in the first period possess  efficiency units of labor in the second 
period. At the same time, uneducated individuals are assumed to possess only one 
efficiency unit of labor. In addition to working and repaying the debt from the first period, 
individuals must also save funds in the second period in order to consume in the third 
period of their life. The third period is namely a retirement period and individuals work no 
longer. It is assumed that individuals have similar preferences. 
 
An educational decision is made by comparing utility with and without an investment in 
education. It is optimal for an individual  to invest in education if his income in the 
second period will be higher with the educational investment than without the 
investment. That is when 
     '01 − 01 + #∗1 > '01.                                           02.41 
A critical value for the latent ability can be found out by solving the inequality. As can be 
easily seen, the critical value for the latent ability is given by 
Y = 65Z0D1[\0][^∗165Z0D1 .                                                          02.51 
As a consequence, it is profitable for those individuals with a latent ability higher than Y 
to invest in education, while for those who possess a latent ability equal to or lower than 
Y it is not profitable to acquire education. It is assumed that Y ∈ K0 + `, O − `M, where 
0 < ` < Sa.    
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The proportion of educated workers in the previous period is assumed to cause an 
economy wide growth externality. This illustrates the fact that knowledge and other 
intangible assets have imperfect property rights. Once a new innovation has been created 
it diffuses throughout the society and throughout the generations
10
. As a result,   
positively depends on the proportion of educated individuals in the previous period, 
denoted by b], and can thus be written as 
 = 0b]1,                                                          02.61 
where                                               
b] = Q P01RSdY5ef , 
and 
´0b]1 > 0. 
 
Because 
IdY5Ig5ef = − \0][^
∗16h0g5ef16i0g5ef1Z0D1 < 0                                            02.71 
and as a consequence 
Ig5Ig5ef = PkYl \0][^
∗16m0g5ef16i0g5ef1Z0D1 > 0,                                      02.81 
it can be easily proven that the proportion of educated individuals in period 
 is an 
increasing function of the proportion of educated workers in period 
 − 1. This leads to 
an even greater externality in period 
 + 1. The state of the technology also has the 
following properties: 001 = 1, standing for the fact that there exists no externality if 
there were no educated individuals in the previous period  and, on the other hand, 011 
is finite. 
 
                                                      
10
 See for example Tamura (1991). 
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It can be assumed that it is profitable for the most talented individual to acquire 
education even though there were no educated individuals in the previous period, that is 
O is high enough. On the other hand, there is always an individual  with his latent ability 
equaling zero and thus there must exists at least one steady state equilibrium o for the 
amount of educated individuals. Whether there are more equilibria depends on the 
properties of the 0b]1 function. The possibility of multiple equilibria will be analyzed 
more closely later on in the thesis. But before that it will be considered how emigration of 
some of the educated individuals affects the amount of highly skilled individuals in the 
economy and thus also the economic growth of the source country.  
 
2.3 Highly Skilled Emigration 
 
As already mentioned earlier, it is reasonable to assume that only a proportion of the 
educated individuals face an opportunity to emigrate from their home country. An 
exogenous emigration probability for the highly skilled individuals is thought to be given 
by . The uneducated individuals do not have the chance to emigrate and thus spend 
their whole life in the source country of emigration. This assumption is justifiable because 
there is a lot of evidence for positive selection when considering emigration from 
developing countries into developed countries. For example Grogger and Hanson (2011) 
have demonstrated that migrants tend to be more educated relative to non-migrants, 
especially the larger the skill-related difference in wage rates between the source and the 
destination countries. The highly skilled individuals are encouraged to emigrate because 
the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in the receiving country, '∗, exceeds the local 
wage rate per efficiency unit, '. This results from the assumption that the level of 
technology in the more advanced country ∗ is larger than 011, the highest possible 
level of technology in the less developed country.  
 
The emigration possibility now modifies the education decision into an expected utility 
problem. In order to keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that individuals are risk 
neutral. An individual deciding whether to invest in education once again compares the 
13 
 
income of the second period with an educational investment and without the investment. 
The education decision problem can now be written as 
0'∗ + 01 − 1'1 − 01 + #∗1 > '.                                    02.91 
The critical value for the latent ability, by solving the inequality 02.91, now becomes 
Y = 65Z[\0][^∗1qZ∗[0]bq165Z,                                                       02.101 
and all the individuals possessing a latent ability greater than Y find it profitable to 
acquire education. The average proportion of the educated individuals staying in the 
source country of emigration is given by 
 = 0]bq1r s0dt1Idtuvw5]bq3r s0dt1Idtuvw5 9,                                                    02.111 
where the numerator represents the amount of educated workers staying in the home 
country and the denominator stands for the amount of the whole population after 
emigration has taken place. It can now be shown that there exists a possibility of 
beneficial brain drain if a sufficient number of individuals is motivated to invest in 
education with a sufficiently low possibility of emigration. 
 
An economy is in autarky when  = 0. On the other hand,  = 1 indicates that  = 0 
and brain drain causes only negative effects on the source economy as there are no highly 
skilled individuals staying in the developing country. As a result, the emigration possibility 
needs to be low enough in order to lead to beneficial brain drain. The sufficient condition 
for the brain drain to result in productivity improvements can thus be estimated at  = 0. 
Brain drain causes positive effects on the productivity growth whenever 
Ig5Iq > 0 , that is 
when the proportion of the educated individuals increases as a result of the highly skilled 
emigration.  
 
The differentiation of the equation 02.111 with respect to the emigration possibility  
gives 
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Ig5Iq = xg5xq + xg5xdY5 xdY5xq ,                                                    02.121 
where 
xg5xq = − r s0dt1Idty]br s0dt1Idt
uvw5 zuvw5
y]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 z
i ,                                        02.131 
xg5xdY5 = − 0]bq1skdY5ly]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 zi                                               02.141 
and 
xdY5xq = − k65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1KqZ∗[0]bq165ZMi .                                         02.151 
Clearly, it can be seen that 
xg5xq < 0, xg5xdY5 < 0 and xdY5xq < 0.  
 
The estimation of the optimal level of brain drain at  = 0 results in 
Ig5Iq ∣q|F= −r P01R 31 − r P01RSdY5 9 + PkYl k65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1065Z1i > 0SdY5   
⇔	skdY5lk65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1065Z1i > r P01R 31 − r P01RSdY5 9SdY5 .           02.161 
Because r P01R 31 − r P01RSdY5 9SdY5  cannot exceed the value of ]~, the condition for 
beneficial brain drain can be summarized as stated in Proposition 1.   
 
Proposition 1 Whenever it is valid for PkYl, , ', '∗, and #∗ that 
skdYlk65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1065Z1i > ]~, 
brain drain induces positive effects on the productivity of the source economy. In 
Proposition 1, Y depicts the lowest level of ability of an individual choosing to acquire 
education when the economy is in autarky.  
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The intuition behind the Proposition 1 can be presented more simply by assuming that 
the latent abilities are uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution leads to certain 
properties for the density function P01. First of all P01 = ]S 11, and consequently 
r P01R = r ]S RSdY5 = 1 − dY5SSdY5 . Using these properties, the condition for beneficial 
brain drain can be redefined as 
Ig5Iq > 0	 ⇔ 1 − dY5S < 01 − 1 Z∗b65ZqZ∗[0]bq165Z.                            02.171 
From the equation 02.171 it can be seen that emigration of highly skilled individuals, that 
is brain drain, increases the amount of educated individuals of the developing country if 
the emigration possibility  is low and if the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor of the 
developed country, '∗, is high relative to the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor of the 
developing country, '. On the other hand, also the proportion of educated individuals 
of the previous period affects the outcome of brain drain through . If the number of 
educated individuals in the previous period is low, there are positive effects on the 
growth of the source country. This can be seen in Figure 1 by illustrating the influences of 
brain drain. 
 
                                                      
11
 See for example Hastings and Peacock (1974), pp. 116. 
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Figure 1. Influences of brain drain on the proportion of highly skilled individuals staying in 
the source country of emigration. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the threshold level of the latent ability reduces from Y to YSs as 
a result of brain drain. This can be seen by comparing the equations 02.51 and 02.101. 
Because the denominator of the equation 02.101 is larger than the denominator of the 
equation 02.51, the emigration possibility decreases the critical level of latent ability 
required for a profitable educational investment. The amount of educated individuals 
thus increases by 
dYbdYuS  when a proportion   of the educated individuals of the 
developing country emigrate. However, the amount of educated individuals staying in 
their home country decreases by  SbdYuS . Whether the effect of brain drain on the source 
country is positive or negative can be found out by comparing the lined rectangle in 
Figure 1, representing the individuals encouraged to acquire education as a result of the 
emigration possibility, with the darker rectangle in Figure 1, representing the educated 
individuals emigrating from the source country as a result of the emigration possibility. As 
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can be seen from the Figure 1, brain drain results in positive effects if the possibility of 
emigration is sufficiently low and if the proportion of educated individuals was previously 
low. From the equation 02.171 it can also be seen that if the wage rate per efficiency unit 
of labor of the receiving country is high enough compared to the wage rate of the source 
country there will exist a positive level of emigration possibility  such that results in 
positive productivity effects in the less developed country. This represents the incentive 
effect produced by higher possible earnings in the developed country. The results of this 
section are summarized in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 Brain drain results in positive effects on the productivity of the source 
country if 
1. the emigration possibility is low enough, 
2. the proportion of educated individuals in the previous period was low, and 
3. the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in the developed country is sufficiently 
high.  
 
In this section no strict assumptions about the properties of the production function were 
made. It was only assumed that the production function has constant returns to scale.  On 
the other hand, it was also ignored that the uneducated individuals have a possibility to 
earn income during the first period while the others are acquiring education. Therefore, 
an approach with more comprehensive assumptions about the production possibilities 
and the lifetime utilities of educated and uneducated workers will be derived in the next 
section. In order to examine whether there exists a possibility of multiple equilibria, the 
production function and the utility function of an individual will be determined more 
accurately. When there is more information about the existing equilibria, the dynamics 
caused by highly skilled emigration can be examined.    
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3 Role of Human Capital Accumulation 
 
In this section, an overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation and 
endogenous growth will be introduced based on a paper written by Frédéric Docquier and 
Hillel Rapoport in 2012. As in the previous section, we will first examine an economy 
without migration possibilities and will later include the emigration of highly skilled 
workers into the analysis. 
 
The first step is to build a wage-setting equation which is determined by the production 
sector of the economy. When constructing the wage-setting equation, it is again assumed 
that the economic performance of a country depends on the average level of human 
capital of the country. The properties of the wage-setting curve will be studied more 
closely in section 3.2 where human capital affects technological evolution through 
imitation and innovation industries. After the impacts of the amount of skilled labor on 
the equilibrium growth rate have been examined, a skill-setting equation will be derived 
to illustrate the accumulation of human capital in the economy. These two equations will 
then determine the possible equilibria of the economy. The mathematical results of this 
section are derived in Appendix B.  
 
3.1 Wage-Setting  
 
Similarly to the previous section, the economy is assumed to consist of firms and 
individuals who live for three periods. During the first two periods, youth and adulthood, 
individuals work and decide on education and the third period, on the other hand, is a 
retirement period. Workers are assumed to be either low skilled or high skilled depending 
on their education decision made in the first period. On the contrary to the previous 
section, the production function is determined more accurately. It is assumed that a 
composite good in the economy is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
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                                                                  , = ]b,                                                      03.11 
where   describes total factor productivity,  represents physical capital, and  labor 
in efficiency units used in the production in period 
.  includes both highly skilled and 
low skilled labor which are considered as perfect substitutes for the time being. The 
number of efficiency units offered by a low skilled worker is normalized to one and a 
highly skilled worker can then be assumed to offer 1 +  efficiency units of labor, where 
 > 0. In addition,   depicts the share of physical capital in national income and 
 ∈ K0, 1M. Writing the production function in the per worker form it becomes         
                                                                    - = ℎ]b,                                                    03.21                             
where - is the GDP per worker,  denotes the stock of capital per worker, and ℎ  
describes the average number of efficiency units of labor.  
 
The returns to physical capital are assumed to be equalized at the international level 
because of perfect mobility of capital. There is thus one prevalent interest rate across 
nations, and !∗ is used to denote the risk-free, international interest factor which is 
defined as !∗ = 1 + #∗. However, in contrast to section 2 each country is characterized 
by a certain risk premium typical for the country, and  ≥ 1 is equal to one plus the risk 
premium for the given country. The existing risk premia illustrate the fact that in spite of 
the integration of financial markets the real interest rates still tend to differ across 
countries
12
. Given these conditions the returns to physical capital are determined by the 
marginal product of capital as 
!∗ = I5ID5 = b]ℎ]b.                                            03.31                                                                  
The wage rate per efficiency unit of labor is, on the other hand, given by the marginal 
product of labor as 
' = I5I5 = 01 − 1ℎb.                                           03.41      
  
                                                      
12
 See for example Mishkin (1984). 
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From the equation 03.31, the value of  can be solved to be                                                 
 = 35∗565 9
fef ℎ .                                                       03.51 
By inserting the equation 03.51 into the equation 03.21, the GDP per worker of the 
economy becomes 
	- = 3 655∗59
ffe ℎ.                                                   03.61 
 
The same presumptions about the production function can be assumed to apply for a 
technologically more advanced country. By denoting the parameters of a leading 
economy by a superscript *, the GDP per capita of the developed country can be written 
as                                                               
                                                       -∗ = 3 65∗5∗5∗9
ffe ℎ∗.                                                   03.71 
Now, the GDP of the developing country can be expressed relative to that of the 
developed country in the following way: 
55∗ = 36565∗9
ffe 355∗9
efe 355∗9.                                             03.81 
Therefore, as can be seen from the equation 03.81, the gap in the economic performance 
between the countries depends on the total factor productivities of the countries, the risk 
premiums, and the average numbers of efficiency units of labor.  
 
The solved  in the equation 03.51 can also be inserted into the equation 03.41 in order 
to solve the relative wage ratio between the countries. For the developing country the 
wage rate per efficiency unit of labor can be written as                                              
' = 01 − 1 3 655∗59
ffe,                                             03.91                                        
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and thus for the developed country it applies that 
                                                    '∗ = 01 − 1 3 65∗5∗5∗9
ffe.                                          03.101           
Hereby, when comparing the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in the developing 
country relative to that of the developed country, the ratio of the wage rates becomes  
Z5Z5∗ = 36565∗9
ffe 355∗9
efe.                                              03.111       
The relation of the wage rates per efficiency units of labor will be denoted by  in what 
follows.  
 
From the equation 03.111 it can be seen that the ratio of the wage rates depends on the 
total factor productivities of the countries and also on the risk premiums. Thus,  is not 
directly relative to the human capital endowments. The level of technology and the risk 
premiums can nevertheless be considered to depend on the quality of workers
13
. As a 
consequence, the wage-setting equation can be determined to depend on the average 
level of domestic human capital, the average stock of human capital of the developed 
country, and other characteristics according to a function  as 
 = 0ℎ, ℎ∗, *1,                                                  03.121      
where * represents a vector of country characteristics affecting the wage level. It is 
assumed that 00, ℎ∗, *1 > 0, m > 0, and mm ≶ 0. The last assumption implies that 
the economy might follow local increasing returns or threshold externalities. Both of 
these concepts extend the traditional growth models which expect the per capita growth 
rate to be a decreasing function of the level of per capita capital stock. We will shortly 
take a look at the concepts. 
                                                      
13
 As stated by Docquier and Rapoport (2012), migration affects international transaction costs and thus 
facilitates the movements of goods and capital between countries. These network externalities, on the 
other hand, impact on international trade and FDI (foreign direct investment). The effects can be included 
into the risk premium factor  by having an impact on international transaction costs and on institutional 
risk. In particular, an increase in the average level of human capital decreases the risk premium of the 
country. For more information see Docquier and Rapoport (2012). The effect of average level of human 
capital on the total factor productivity will be paid attention to in the following subsection 3.2. 
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Local increasing returns refer to a phenomenon where knowledge, or alternatively human 
capital, is considered as an input that exhibits increasing marginal productivity. By 
assuming endogenous technological change a model of long-run growth with increasing 
returns can be introduced with this presumption
14
. The accumulation of knowledge is 
considered as the main factor driving the long-run growth. New knowledge is produced 
by a research technology that exhibits diminishing returns. However, creation of new 
knowledge causes a natural externality. If a firm invests in the production of knowledge, a 
positive external effect is caused because the production possibilities of other firms also 
expand. As a consequence, knowledge has an increasing marginal product and it is always 
beneficial to invest in the creation of new knowledge. Nevertheless, the properties of the 
production of output and knowledge guarantee an existence of a competitive 
equilibrium. Because the research technology exhibits diminishing returns, there exists a 
maximum rate of growth for knowledge and this leads to an existence of a maximum 
feasible rate of growth for the output. 
 
Technological externalities with a threshold property have, on the other hand, been 
utilized to explore the fact that per capita growth rates tend to differ sustainably between 
countries, even though the countries are identically structured. An externality can arise 
from spillovers of capital stocks or alternatively from the process of creating human 
capital. The main idea behind the threshold externalities is that with a certain technology, 
differences in the stocks of inputs may lead to different growth rates. Once physical 
capital or the level of human capital exceeds a certain critical value, production 
possibilities may expand and the expansion might be rapid
15
.  This means that as the per 
capita production surpasses a critical value, the inputs become more favorable to the 
economic expansion. Because different initial values for the inputs result in different 
dynamics, an economy may generate multiple equilibria. These differences in dynamic 
behavior are called threshold effects and they arise from variations in social returns to 
                                                      
14
 See for example a model derived by Romer in 1986. 
15
 See for example Azariadis and Drazen (1990) for a growth model of technological externalities with 
threshold properties. They have also tested empirically whether economic growth is correlated with 
investments in human capital relative to per capita GDP by using literacy as a measure of the quality of 
human capital. As a result, they have found out that none of the countries of their data sets was able to 
grow quickly without a highly qualified labor force. 
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scale. In order to examine the possible impacts of increasing returns and threshold 
externalities on the wage-setting curve, the effects of human capital on the technological 
development will be examined more closely in the following subsection. The properties of 
the wage-setting curve will be specified utilizing a paper written by Jérôme 
Vandenbussche et al. in 2006. Similarly to the local increasing returns, it will be assumed 
that human capital is the main factor inducing economic growth.  
 
3.2 Properties of the Wage-Setting Curve   
 
Human capital can affect technological progress through two different sources. Following 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), these sources are adoption or imitation of existing 
technologies and innovation of new technologies. It can be assumed that imitation and 
innovation activities require different types of human capital. Especially, unskilled human 
capital is more suitable in the process of imitation than in innovation. On the other hand, 
skilled human capital is more efficient in order to engender innovations. In addition to the 
allocation of human capital across imitation and innovation, the country’s level of 
technological development affects the impact of human capital on growth. Consequently, 
both the composition of human capital and the distance to the technological frontier 
must be paid attention to when considering the effects of human capital on technological 
development.  
 
The economy includes   sectors which carry out technological improvements by 
combining innovations and imitations. The two activities exploit both high skilled and low 
skilled labor. The endowments of educated and uneducated workers are denoted by  
and % respectively. Final output of the sectors producing technological improvements in 
terms of efficiency units of labor, -, is also produced competitively according to the 
Cobb-Douglas production function using a continuum of mass 1 of intermediate inputs 
and land. The production function can thus be written as 
- = ]b r ,]b , R]F ,                                             03.131 
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where , is the productivity of sector  of the economy,  , is the flow of intermediate 
good , and  is the amount of land used in the production in period 
. The total supply of 
land can be normalized to one and  ∈ K0,1M as before. Because of the competitive 
nature of the production, the price of each intermediate good is determined by its 
marginal product in the following way: 
, = I5It,5 = ,]b ,b].                                          03.141 
 
It can be thought that there is one producer in every intermediate good sector . The 
producer produces with the productivity ,, which will be converted endogenous in 
what follows, and uses final good as capital according to a one-for-one technology. The 
producer desires to maximize his profits and thus chooses the flow of intermediate good 
 , in order to solve his maximization problem 
maxt,5 k, , −  ,l. 
Inserting the price of an intermediate good  in the equation 03.141 into the maximization 
problem and solving it gives the equilibrium demand for each intermediate input as 
 , =  ife,.                                                         03.151 
As a result, the profit of a producer producing in sector  can be written as 
, = k, − 1l , = k,]b ,b] − 1l , = ,]b  a]b,b] − 1 a]b, 
= ,]ba0b]1]b ,b] − 1  a]b, = 1 − 1
a]b,. 
By denoting  ≡ 3] − 19 ife, the profit function becomes 
, = ,.                                                       03.161 
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At the beginning of each period, producers decide how to combine imitation and 
innovation activities in their production. Hereby, they also choose the amounts of high 
skilled and low skilled workers demanded. A function  can be used to describe the 
dynamics of the technology according to the following equation: 
, = ,b] + kb]∗ − b], b], &,,, ,,, &,,, ,,l,             03.171 
where b]∗  is the productivity at the world’s technological frontier in period 
 − 1 and 
b] is the productivity at the country’s technological frontier at the end of the period 

 − 1. &,, and ,, are the amounts of unskilled and skilled workers utilized by sector  
in imitation in period 
. On the other hand, &,, and ,, are the amounts of unskilled 
and skilled labor inputs used in innovation during the same period. Function   is 
increasing in all of its arguments. If technological progress is assumed to be a linear 
function of imitation and innovation, the equation 03.171 takes the form 
, = ,b] + &,,,,]b0b]∗ − b]1 + &,,,,]bb].        03.181 
 
In the equation 03.181,  represents the elasticity of unskilled labor in the activity of 
imitation and ,similarly,  is the elasticity of unskilled labor in innovation.  > 0 describes 
the fact that innovations are more productive in the generation of technological growth 
than adopting of the existing technologies. The efficiency of the whole process of 
technological improvements is depicted by  > 0. Because skilled labor is utilized more 
intensively in the activity of innovation, the elasticity of skilled labor must be larger in 
innovation than in imitation. On the contrary, the elasticity of low skilled labor must be 
higher in imitation than in innovation. These properties of the elasticities result in the 
condition  < . The condition will be made use of later on.  
 
The wage rates of the uneducated and educated workers working for technological 
improvements are now denoted by '),b]∗  and '(,b]∗  respectively. As a 
consequence, an improvement in the productivity requires a labor cost 
, = '),k&,, + &,,l + '(,k,, + ,,lb]∗                       03.191 
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by the producer of sector . Producers choose their labor inputs in order to maximize 
their current profits net of labor costs. The maximization problem of the producer  is 
thus given by 
max),t,5,),t,5,(,t,5,(,t,5  y,b] + &,,,,]b0b]∗ − b]1 + &,,,,]bb]z 
                                   −,.                                                                                                       03.201 
However, as ,b] does not depend on the values of labor inputs of the period 
, the 
producer’s maximization problem can be simplified into the form 
max),t,5,),t,5,(,t,5,(,t,5 &,,,,]b01 − b]1 + &,,,,]bb]b]∗  
                                            −,,                                                                                              03.211 
where b] ≡ b] b]∗⁄  represents country’s inverse distance to the technological 
frontier in period 
 − 1. On the other hand, because all the producers face the same 
maximization problem, the  subscripts can be ignored and as a consequence  = , +
,  and % = &, + &,  in equilibrium.   The maximization problem can again be 
rewritten as 
max),5,),5,(,5,(,5 &,,]b01 − b]1 + &,,]bb]b]∗ − .      03.221 
 
Solving the producer’s maximization problem gives two equalities for an interior solution: 
&b]]b01 − 1 = 0% − &1b]0 − 1]b                    03.231 
and 
01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 10% − &10 − 1b.             03.241 
By dividing both equations by their right-hand sides and by then combining the equations, 
the following result can be received: 
01 − 10% − &1 = 01 − 1&0 − 1.                         03.251 
For simplicity, the time indices are ignored. By rewriting the equation 03.251 as 
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30]b10]b19 3 b)¡b(9 = )(   
⟺ 	£3)(9 = )( ,                                                     03.261 
where £ ≡ 0]b10]b1 > 1, it can be seen that between innovation and imitation the ratios of 
unskilled to skilled labor are proportional to each other. 
 
The amount of unskilled workers demanded for imitation as a function of skilled workers 
in imitation can be solved from the equation 03.251 as 
& = ¤ (¡[0¤b]1(.                                                      03.271 
Now, substituting the equation 03.271 into the equation 03.241 results in the following 
result: 
0£ − 11 = ¥01% − ,                                           03.281 
where ¥01 ≡ 30]b1¤¦0]b§10]b1¨§ 9
f¦e©
 is a decreasing function of . 
 
Because in equilibrium it must be that   ≤  and  ≤ , an interior solution only 
exists if it holds true that 
«0§1
¤ ≤ ¡  ≤ ¥01.                                                    03.291 
This can be realized by using the equation 03.281. Equation 03.291 determines certain 
conditions for relative endowments of educated and uneducated labor. When a country is 
relatively abundant in unskilled labor, 
¡
  is small and the country approaches the lower 
boundary of the condition. At the lower boundary, when 
¡
  = «0§1¤ ,  =   and the 
country specializes in imitation. On the other hand, when a country is relatively more 
abundant in skilled labor it comes closer to the upper boundary. At the upper boundary 
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 =  and the country invests only in innovation in order to accomplish technological 
improvements. 
 
Using the equations 03.271 and 03.281, the relative factor intensities can be written as 
)( = ¤«0§1                                                            03.301 
and 
)( = ]«0§1.                                                           03.311 
From the equations 03.301 and 03.311 it can be noted that the factor intensities do not 
depend on the total factor endowments. Thus, Figure 2 can be utilized to analyze the 
properties of the sectors implementing technological improvements. 
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Figure 2. Relative factor intensities and the allocation of human capital across imitation 
and innovation. 
 
In Figure 2, the amount of uneducated labor is given on the horizontal axis, while the 
amount of educated labor is given on the vertical axis. 0¬1 and 0­1 lines are depicted 
using the condition 03.291. 0­1 line represents the upper boundary of the condition. 
Above the 0­1 line  =  and, therefore, the country is fully specialized in innovation. 
On the other hand, below the 0¬1 line the whole labor force is dedicated to imitation. If 
the country is located between these two lines, for example at point , there are 
investments both in innovation and imitation. In Figure 2, vector ® represents the share 
of the labor force used in innovation and vector ®O the share of labor force used in 
imitation. Along the 0¯¯1 line the aggregate level of labor is kept constant but the 
composition of unskilled and skilled labor between the activities changes. If the 0¯¯1 line, 
however, moves further away from the origin, both of the labor inputs increase in equal 
proportion and there is also a proportionally equal increase in skilled and unskilled labor 
in both innovation and imitation.  
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Due to an increase in the amount of skilled labor, an economy moves closer to the 0­1 
line, as shown by the equation 03.291, and both skilled and unskilled labor are used more 
intensively in innovation and less intensively in imitation. This is a consequence of the 
condition  < . Because the elasticity of skilled labor in innovation is larger than the 
elasticity of skilled labor in imitation, an increase in  leads to a proportionally greater 
increase in the amount of skilled labor utilized in innovation than in the amount of skilled 
labor utilized in imitation. As a consequence, the marginal productivity of unskilled labor 
increases more in innovation and a part of the unskilled labor force is attracted away 
from imitation. As the amount of unskilled labor employed in imitation decreases, also 
the productivity of skilled labor decreases. As a result, even more of the skilled workers 
shift from imitation to innovation and eventually the amount of both types of workers 
increases in innovation and decreases in imitation. On the contrary, if the amount of 
unskilled labor increases, more of both of the labor inputs are utilized in imitation. 
 
In addition to the absolute quantities of the labor inputs, the value of  needs to be taken 
into consideration because it also affects the allocation of labor endowments between 
innovation and imitation. If the value of  increases the economy approaches the world´s 
technological frontier.  In that case ¥01 diminishes and both the lower and the upper 
boundary of the condition 03.291 decline. In Figure 2, 0­1 and 0¬1 lines shift downwards 
into the direction of the horizontal axis and, as a consequence, skilled and unskilled labor 
transfer from imitation to innovation. On the contrary, further away from the 
technological frontier more of the labor force is distributed into the activity of imitation. 
Hereby, it can be summarized that when both imitation and innovation are made use of 
in order to accomplish technological improvements, the optimal amount of skilled and 
unskilled labor utilized in imitation is increasing (decreasing) in the total number of 
unskilled (skilled) labor, and decreasing in the distance to the technological frontier. In 
reality it can be hypothesized that imitation and innovation contain complementarity, at 
least to some extent. Consequently, corner solutions can be ruled out and from now on 
the analysis concentrates only on the interior solutions. 
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Next, it will be considered how changes in the supply of skilled labor affect the 
equilibrium growth rate of the economy. The growth rate in period 
 is given by 
° = r 6t,5b65ef65ef R]F .  
By using the equations 03.181, 03.271 and 03.281, the equilibrium growth rate can be 
defined as 
±
²¨ = ]b K01 − 1¥01b − 01 − 1¥01]b%M.                      03.321 
As can been seen from the equation 03.321, as a function of distance to the technological 
frontier the two types of human capital have bidirectional effect on the growth rate. 
Because 
3 ]²¨9 I±I¡ = 0]b10b1 ¥01b > 0  
and 
3 ]²¨9 I±I  = − 0]b10b1 ¥01]b < 0,  
the growth rate is increasing in the amount of skilled labor
16
, while on the other hand the 
productivity growth is decreasing in the amount of unskilled labor. The positive effect of 
an increase in the stock of skilled human capital on the productivity growth can be seen 
to dominate the negative effect of unskilled human capital the more the closer the 
economy is situated to the technological frontier. 
 
As the country approaches the technological frontier, the first term of the equation 
03.321 becomes larger and larger. On the contrary, the second term in the square 
brackets becomes smaller and smaller as the value of  comes closer to one. As a result, a 
marginal increase in the stock of skilled human capital speeds up the growth rate all the 
more the closer the economy is situated to the technological frontier. This phenomenon 
                                                      
16
 This is in line with Turcotte and Rennison (2004) who have proved empirically, by using statistics of 
Canada, that the productivity level depends positively on the share of workers who have completed a 
university degree, and on the share of workers who have taken part in formal trainings. 
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results from the fact that ¥01 is a decreasing function of  and on the other hand from 
the observation already stated previously that an increase in the stock of skilled labor 
induces both educated and uneducated workers to move over from imitation to 
innovation sector. Consequently, the innovation term of a technological improvement 
increases in the equation 03.181, while the imitation term decreases. The positive impact 
on innovation can be seen to dominate the negative impact on imitation because 
according to the equations 03.301 and 03.311 the factor intensities are proportional to 
each other and moreover increasing in . Therefore, as the country approaches the 
technological frontier the amount of unskilled labor utilized in innovation must be 
increasing more rapidly than the amount of skilled labor utilized in innovation. On the 
other hand, the amount of unskilled labor employed in imitation must be decreasing 
slower than the amount of skilled labor in imitation. As a consequence, an increase in the 
stock of skilled labor speeds up technological progress. Because the wage-setting 
equation depends positively on the total factor productivity of the country, as shown by 
the equation 03.111, also the wage-setting curve is increasing in the average quality of 
human capital and in the proximity to the technological frontier. 
 
The accelerating effect of an increase of the stock of skilled labor on the productivity 
growth does not however last endlessly but deteriorates gradually as the country comes 
closer to the technological frontier.  This can be seen by differentiating the derivative of 
the growth rate with respect to the skilled human capital for the second time with respect 
to the proximity to the technological frontier. As a result we have 
]
²¨
Ii±
I¡I§ = y− 0]b10b1 ¥01bb]z ¥´01.                            03.331 
Because ¥01 ≡ 30]b1¤¦0]b§10]b1¨§ 9
f¦e©
, the derivative of ¥01 with respect to  is   
¥´01 = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© 3]§ − 19
fe¦³©¦e© .                           03.341 
As the country approaches the technological frontier, the limit of ¥´01 becomes zero 
because  
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lim§→] 1 − 1 = 0. 
Consequently,  
lim
§→]
Ra°
RR
= 0 
and also the limit of the growth rate approaches zero the closer the country is situated to 
the technological frontier. Therefore, the growth rate slows down as the technological 
development proceeds. This follows from the fact that if the creation of innovations 
exploits skilled labor more intensively than the imitation activities, even countries 
situating far from the technological frontier utilize most of the skilled labor in innovation. 
As a result, the amount of skilled workers transferring form imitation to innovation must 
decrease little by little as a country approaches the frontier. The results of this section are 
summarized in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3 
1. A marginal increase in the stock of skilled human capital speeds up growth as the 
country approaches the technological frontier. 
2. The accelerating effect becomes weaker the closer the country is situated to the 
technological frontier because  < . 
 
 
3.3 Skill-Setting  
 
Before proceeding into the equilibrium analysis, we will still take a look at the decision 
making of individuals based on the paper by Docquier and Rapoport (2012). The utility of 
individuals is now assumed to depend on their consumption during all the three periods 
of their lives. In period 
 young individuals maximize their lifetime utility and can choose 
to spend their time working or, alternatively, investing in education. If they decide to 
work they will receive a wage '. Education + is again an either-or decision. Hereby, if an 
individual invests in education + = 1, and otherwise + = 0.  Education entails a cost 
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' , where  captures individual’s ability to learn and is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed on K0, 1M. It can be thought that the cost represents the wages lost during 
acquiring education. The adulthood wage depends on whether an individual acquired 
education during the youth or not. Uneducated individuals will receive a wage '[], 
while those who invested in education will receive a wage 01 + 1'[]. The wage in the 
second period is used for consumption and savings. The savings $[] alone determine the 
consumption during the third period. 
 
The utility function is now assumed to be logarithmic and is written as 
%0+, 	$[]1 = ln0' − 	 − +'1
+ 01 − 1 ln0'[]01 + +1 − $[]1 +  ln0$[]![a∗ 1,																								03.351 
where 	 > 0 signifies a minimum level of subsistence in the first period17. It is assumed 
that there is no such minimum subsistence level during the other two periods. λ, on the 
other hand, represents time preference and the relative length of the retirement period. 
By maximizing the utility function with respect to the savings, the fraction of income that 
individuals save during the second period of their lives becomes      
                                         
I 0µ5,¶5³f1I¶5³f = − 0]b·1Z5³f0][µ5¸1b¶5³f + ![a∗ ·¶5³f5³i∗ = 0                 		                         
                                               ⟺            $[] = k'[]01 + +1l.                                      03.361 
From the equation 03.361 it can thus be seen that savings equal a fraction λ of the second 
period income. As a result, the utility function can be rewritten as 
% 3+, k'[]01 + +1l9 = ln0' − 	 − +'1 + lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln0![a∗ 1		 
+ ln01 + 01 − 1 ln01 − 1.                                                03.371 
Because  ln01 + 01 − 1 ln01 − 1 is a constant, a new function ¹ can be defined as 
                                                ¹ ≡  ln01 + 01 − 1 ln01 − 1                                           03.381 
                                                      
17
 See for example Belot and Hatton (2012) for the importance of the liquidity constraint on educational 
selectivity.  
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and, consequently, the utility function becomes 
              º0+1 = ln0' − 	 − +'1 + lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹.         03.391 
 
When considering whether to acquire education, an individual compares his discounted 
lifetime incomes with an educational investment and without the investment. It is 
profitable for an individual to invest in education if º011 > º001, that is if his expected 
lifetime utility with education is greater than the utility without education. Solving the 
inequality gives: 
º011 > º001			⟺   3 ¸][¸9 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9 > .                                    03.401 
As a consequence, there exists a critical value for the cost of education defined as  
	 = 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9 3 ¸][¸9.                                                     03.411 
 
The minimum level of consumption during the first period can be assumed to be a 
constant fraction  of the wage rate of the developed country, that is 	 = '∗. This is a 
reasonable assumption because the liquidity constraints are more binding in the low 
income countries than in the technologically more advanced countries. In this case the 
critical value for the cost of education can be rewritten as  
	 = 3Z5b»Z5∗Z5 9 3 ¸][¸9 = 3Z5Z5 −  Z5
∗
Z59 3 ¸][¸9 = 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9.                     03.421 
From the equation 03.401 it can be seen that if an individual faces a cost  < 	  he will 
acquire education and if  ≥ 	  there is no incentive to invest in education. For the critical 
value, given in the equation 03.411, it holds true that 
I\5	IZ5 = 3Z5b0Z5b»5¼1Z5i 9 3 ¸][¸9 = 3»5¼Z5i9 3 ¸][¸9 > 0                                  03.431	
and 
I\5	I¸ = 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9 30][¸1b¸0][¸1i 9 = 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9 3 ]0][¸1i9 > 0,                              03.441 
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because the minimum subsistence level cannot exceed the income earned in period 
.  
 
Because  is assumed to be uniformly distributed, 	  also determines the proportion of 
the young who educate themselves. When there is no possibility of emigration, as is 
assumed for the time being, 	  also specifies the proportion of the educated in the second 
period. If the proportion of skilled workers is denoted by , it follows that [] = 	  as 
long as the country is in autarky. The proportion of the educated individuals in the second 
period positively depends on the wage rate of the developing country ' and on the skill 
premium  as shown by the equations 03.431 and 03.441. Because [] = 	 , the average 
level of human capital of an economy where each adult has  children can be written as  
ℎ[] = 0]bg5³f1[[0][¸1g5³f][ = 1 + g5³f¸][ = 1 + \5	¸][                       03.451 
for the second period. This follows from the assumption that uneducated individuals offer 
one efficiency unit of labor while the educated individuals offer 1 +  efficiency units of 
labor. As can be seen from the equation 03.451, the average level of human capital 
increases with the critical value for the cost of education. 
 
If the critical value for the cost of education in the equation 03.421 is inserted into the 
equation 03.451, the average level of human capital in the second period becomes  
ℎ[] = 1 + ]][ 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9  = 1 + ]][ 3 ¸
i
][¸9 31 − »½59 = 1 + ¸
i
0][10][¸1 31 − »½59  
≡ 01.                                                              03.461      
The equation 03.461 determines how the average level of human capital develops in an 
economy and is thus called the skill-setting equation. For the 01 function it is valid 
that  
I70½51I½5 = »¸
i
0][10][¸1½5i > 0                                               03.471 
and 
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Ii70½51I½5i = − a»¸
i
0][10][¸1½5¾ < 0.                                           03.481 
These results assume that  ≥  because otherwise the minimum subsistence level 
would exceed the income earned during the first period. Therefore, if  <  it must be 
that 01 = 0. 
 
Now there is enough information in order to determine the possible equilibria of the 
economies. When specifying the equilibria, the properties of the skill-setting curve 
derived in equations 03.471 and 03.481 can be utilized. In addition, the features of the 
wage-setting curve described in section 3.2 will be needed.  By combining the skill-setting 
and the wage-setting curves the dynamic effects of brain drain can finally be examined. 
 
4 Effects of Brain Drain 
 
In this section, we will finally pay our attention to the equilibria of the model of human 
capital accumulation. In the possible balanced growth equilibria both the wage-setting 
and the skill-setting equations, that is equations 03.121 and 03.461, are satisfied. It will be 
shown by using the properties of the equations that there exists a possibility of multiple 
equilibria. Thereafter, the existing equilibria can be utilized to examine the effects of 
different policies on the productivity growth of the economy. We are particularly 
interested in the consequences of brain drain. The equations of this section are derived in 
Appendix C. 
 
4.1 Steady States of the Economy 
 
In section 3 a wage-setting equation set by the production sector of the economy and a 
skill-setting equation designated by the individuals maximizing their lifetime utility were 
defined. From now on we will focus on the steady state values of the intensive variables 
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denoted by a subscript $$ . As a consequence, the wage-setting equation can be 
redetermined to be  
¶¶ = ¿0ℎ¶¶1, 
and the skill-setting equation can be rewritten as  
0¶¶1 = 1 + ¸i0][10][¸1 31 − »½ÀÀ9.  
 
The shape of the skill-setting curve can be easily determined by taking advantage of the 
equations 03.471 and 03.481 which show that the skill-setting curve is increasing but has 
diminishing marginal returns with respect to ¶¶. Thus, on a 0ℎ¶¶, ¶¶1 plane the skill-
setting curve is upward sloping and converges to the vertical axis. In addition, ¶¶ must 
exceed the assumed minimum subsistence level  as already mentioned earlier. The 
shape of the wage-setting curve is more complex because its second derivative can be 
either positive or negative as pointed out in section 3.1. However, as was shown in the 
following section 3.2, an increase in the stock of highly skilled human capital enhances 
technological progress and the productivity growth. When the economy approaches the 
world´s technological frontier and begins replacing imitation with innovation, the growth 
rate tends to even speed up. Because the wage-setting equation positively depends on 
the level of the technology, as indicated by the equation 03.111, it also increases as a 
function of the average level of human capital. However, another significant observation 
made in section 3.2 was that as the country comes still closer to the technological frontier 
the productivity growth begins diminishing. This is because as the economy verges on the 
technological frontier, the amount of skilled labor shifting from imitation to innovation 
decreases little by little because it is assumed that innovation sector benefits highly 
skilled labor even far from the frontier. Consequently, the effect of an increase in the 
amount of highly skilled labor on the productivity growth decreases once the country has 
reached a certain technological stage. These properties of the productivity growth with 
respect to the average level of human capital lead to an S-shaped wage-setting curve. The 
skill-setting and the wage-setting curves are depicted in Figure 3.     
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 Figure 3. Long-run equilibria of a closed economy. 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 3, the intersections of 0¶¶1 and ¿0ℎ¶¶1 curves 
determine three different equilibrium points  , O  and  . Point   and point O  are 
dynamically stable equilibria and point , on the other hand, is a dynamically unstable 
equilibrium. It can be thought that point  represents a developing country with low 
average level of human capital situating far from the technological frontier while, at the 
same time, point O depicts a developed country with high average level of human capital. 
The existence of multiple equilibria indicates that variations in the amount of educated 
workers may have long run effects on the productivity of a country. This is in line with 
threshold externalities mentioned earlier in section 3.1. From the Figure 3, it can be seen 
that if an economy starts out with a human capital stock below a critical value, it will 
converge to the steady state 	with low level of per capita income. On the contrary, if the 
economy starts out with a human capital stock above the critical value, it will converge to 
the steady state	O with high level of per capita income. Thus, if there are no outside 
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incentives or government interventions, the initial level of the inputs is the only factor 
affecting the final equilibrium that will be reached. 
 
One possible cause of a threshold externality is the migration of some of the highly skilled 
individuals into a more advanced country. As already noticed in section 2, the emigration 
possibility of educated workers tends to increase the amount of individuals investing in 
education. The emigration possibility could thus operate as an incentive effect and enable 
the source country of emigration to shift from a low level of human capital equilibrium 
into a higher level of human capital equilibrium. The prospects for such shifts will be 
examined for the human capital accumulation approach in what follows. The curves in 
Figure 3 will be used to analyze the consequences of highly skilled emigration.  
 
4.2 Brain Drain 
 
Individuals living in the developing country are now permitted to migrate into a 
developed country. As in section 2, it is assumed that only the educated workers have the 
possibility to migrate and low skilled workers stay in their home country. Moreover, only 
a fraction  of the highly skilled individuals actually emigrate. The proportion of the highly 
skilled individuals staying in the developing country in the second period is thus given by 
[] = 0]bq1\5	]bq\5	 ,                                                        04.11 
where the numerator depicts the amount of the highly skilled individuals staying in the 
source country of emigration and the denominator represents the whole population after 
brain drain has taken place. 
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The utility function 03.391 must now be modified to include the migration prospect for 
the educated individuals. When + = 1, the utility function can be rewritten as  
º011 = ln0' − 	 − '1 + 01 − 1 lnk'[]01 + 1l +  lnk'[]∗ 01 + 1l 
+ ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹.                                                         04.21 
By comparing the utility of an educated worker to the utility of an uneducated worker, 
º001 as in the equation 03.391, a new critical value for the cost of education can be 
calculated to be 
                                              º011 > º001 ⟺  < 31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9.                          04.31 
As a consequence, the critical value of the cost of education is given by 
	 = 31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9,                                           	04.41 
when there exists a possibility of emigration for the educated individuals. Now, if  = 0 
then []q = 1 and 
	 = 31 − »½59 31 − ]][¸9 = 31 − »½59 3][¸][¸ − ]][¸9 = 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9  
as in the equation 03.421 for an autarkic economy. If however 0 <  < 1,  []q < 1 
because it is assumed that the wage rate of the leading economy exceeds the wage rate 
of the local economy. The proportion of individuals acquiring education is now higher 
than without the possibility of emigration because 
31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9 > 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9                              04.51 
applies with all [] < 1 and 0 <  < 1. This result supports the occurrence of the 
incentive effect.  
 
Since we are interested in how the possibility of emigration affects the average level of 
human capital in the developing country, and as a result the productivity growth rate, the 
42 
 
effects of the value of  on the value of [] must be studied. The differentiation of [] 
in the equation 04.11 with respect to  results in  
                                                        
Ig5³fIq 	=	0]bq1
ÂÃ5¼ÂÁb\5	 0]b\5	 10]bq\5	 1i .                                             04.61 
Because the denominator of the equation 04.61 is always positive, beneficial brain drain is 
possible only if the numerator is also positive. It can be easily seen that if  is close to one 
there is no possibility of beneficial brain drain because then 01 − 1 I\5	Iq  becomes small. As 
a consequence, the probability of highly skilled emigration needs to be low enough in 
order to yield possible gains.  The numerator of the equation 04.61 can thus be estimated 
to be positive at  = 0. The derivative of the average level of human capital with respect 
to the emigration possibility at  = 0 is given by  
Ig5³fIq |q|F = I\5	Iq − 	01 − 	1.                                             04.71 
The condition for beneficial brain drain at  = 0 now becomes 
I\5	Iq − 	01 − 	1 > 0  
                                            ⇔			 ln 3Z5³f∗Z5³f9 >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z.                                   04.81 
 
From the equation 04.81 it can be interpreted that the ratio of the wage rates across the 
countries, that is ¶¶, needs to be low enough in order to enable beneficial brain drain. A 
reasonably large difference in skill prices generates a strong incentive to acquire 
education. If '¶¶ and '¶¶∗  are close to each other, the incentive effect vanishes. However, 
it must be noted that if the ratio of the skill prices is too low the liquidity constraint 
becomes strongly binding and it might be impossible to invest in education even though 
one would be willing to. A particularly large difference in wages increases the value of the 
right-hand side of the equation 04.81 and thus deteriorates the possibility of beneficial 
brain drain. The conditions for beneficial brain drain are summarized in Proposition 4. 
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Proposition 4 Conditions for beneficial brain drain:  
1. The differential in skill prices 0¶¶1 needs to be low enough to generate a strong 
incentive effect, but not so low that the liquidity constraint on education 
investment becomes strongly binding. 
2. The probability of high-skilled emigration needs to be sufficiently low. 
 
As a result of the equation 04.81, brain drain can lead to ambiguous effects on the skill-
setting curve in Figure 3. The 0¶¶1 curve might shift to the left for extremely poor 
countries because of the binding liquidity constraint. If individuals struggle to fulfill their 
minimum subsistence level, they certainly do not have the means to invest in education 
even though they would be motivated to. Similarly, the 0¶¶1 curve might shift to the 
left for rich countries as well because the incentive effect does not work anymore. The 
best potential for the 0¶¶1 curve to move to the right is for middle-income countries. 
In the case of middle-income countries, the incentive effect operates but the liquidity 
constraint does not restrain options made by individuals.   The two possible effects on the 
skill-setting curve are illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4a. The 0¶¶1 curve might move to the left for rich countries and for extremely 
poor countries. 
 
 
Figure 4b. The 0¶¶1 curve might move to the right for middle-income countries.  
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As can be seen from the Figure 4a, the migration prospect might lower the average level 
of human capital for extremely poor countries. Simultaneously, they move further away 
from the technological frontier. This observation suggests that there still exists the 
possibility that some of the developing countries are trapped in a poverty trap. However, 
as depicted in the Figure 4b, the average level of human capital increases with the 
possibility of emigration for middle-income countries. Hereby, it is the country 
characteristics that mainly affect the final results of brain drain. To a large extent the 
initial conditions depend on the public policies adopted and can thus be influenced. 
Ultimately, based on the preceding analysis an important conclusion can be made that 
brain drain is a possible source for positive externalities and need not deplete the human 
capital stock of a country. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to delve into the problem of brain drain from the 
perspective of an underdeveloped country. As stated at the beginning of the thesis, the 
conceptions about the effects of brain drain on economic development have contradicted 
each other since the outset of the brain drain literature. Therefore, the main objective of 
the thesis was to find out how high-skilled emigration affects the level of human capital 
and thus the productivity improvements in developing countries. The conditions leading 
to beneficial brain drain were also paid attention to. 
 
At first, a simple economic overview of brain drain was introduced for a closed economy. 
No strict assumptions about the production function or the lifetime utilities of individuals 
were made. However, differences in innate abilities led to differences in educational 
decisions. It was shown that it is profitable only for individuals possessing a latent ability 
above a certain critical level to invest in education. By allowing a proportion of the 
educated workers to immigrate into a more advanced country, it was next pointed out 
that the critical value for the latent ability declines with the emigration possibility. As a 
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result, it was found out that brain drain results in positive effects on the productivity 
growth of the source country of emigration. This however requires that the emigration 
possibility is low enough, the proportion of the highly skilled was low in the previous 
period, and the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in the developed country is high 
relative to the wage rate of the developing country.    
 
After introducing the simple economic overview, an analysis with more accurate 
assumptions about the production function and the utility function was presented in 
order to examine the possibility of multiple equilibria. The model of human capital 
accumulation was derived in two stages. At first a wage-setting equation was developed 
and it was denoted that the wage rate of a developing country relative to the wage rate 
of a developed country depends on the states of the technologies of the countries. As a 
consequence, the ratio of the wage rates is also relative to the average quality of human 
capital. The effects of human capital on technological progress were taken into a closer 
consideration by assuming that technological improvements are created by imitation and 
innovation activities. An increase in the stock of skilled human capital was shown to 
attract both educated and uneducated workers from imitation to innovation, and 
contrariwise. In addition, the growth rate of the economy was proven to be increasing in 
the amount of skilled workers and decreasing in the amount of unskilled workers. 
However, the growth rate deteriorates gradually as the technological progress proceeds 
above a certain level. The second stage of the human capital accumulation model, on the 
other hand, derived a skill-setting equation. By exploiting the utility function of individuals 
it was found out that there exists a certain cost of education that determines the 
proportion of utility maximizing individuals who invest in education. According to that, 
the average level of human capital could be calculated. The development of the average 
level of human capital then specified the skill-setting equation.  
 
Thereafter, the wage-setting and the skill-setting equations were combined in order to 
show that there exist multiple equilibria. A stable equilibrium with a low level of average 
human capital and a long distance to the technological frontier represented a developing 
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country, while on the other hand another stable equilibrium with a high level of average 
human capital represented the leading economy. The wage-setting and the skill-setting 
curves could then be used to study how high-skilled emigration affects the equilibrium 
outcomes. By allowing a part of the educated workers to leave the developing country it 
could be proven that the proportion of individuals acquiring education increases similarly 
as in section 2. However, two necessary conditions for beneficial brain drain were 
derived. First of all, the ratio of the wage rates between the countries should be low 
enough in order to encourage young people to invest in education. Nonetheless, the ratio 
of the skill prices should not be that low that the liquidity constraint becomes strongly 
binding. For the second, the probability of emigration for the highly skilled should be 
sufficiently low.  
 
In summary, both of the models emphasize the significance of an incentive in the form of 
a wage differential between the countries. If the wage rates only differ slightly there is no 
additional incentive to invest in education, not to mention to go through the effort of 
migration. This supports the observations made by the United Nations. In addition, the 
incentive mechanism has also been supported by empirical evidence. For example Beine 
et al. (2008) have shown that emigration of some of the educated workers increases the 
level of human capital of a country. Furthermore, they give support to the other results of 
the simple overview of brain drain. Especially that those countries with low average levels 
of human capital and low high-skilled emigration rates have the best potential to benefit 
from brain drain. However, the existence of the minimum subsistence level also has to be 
taken into account as has been done in the model of human capital accumulation. The 
liquidity constraint limits the choices concerning education and as a consequence 
especially the extremely poor countries are affected by a large wage differential.  
 
The analysis presented in this thesis can be utilized to study the consequences of other 
public policies as well. The observations of those studies could then be used to build ideal 
conditions for human capital formation together with high-skilled emigration. For 
example factors affecting the emigration possibility should be taken into consideration 
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when making policy decisions. Furthermore, another aspect that should also be paid 
attention to is the return migration of the educated individuals. For example Mayr and 
Peri (2009) have uncovered that 20 to 30 per cent of Eastern European and Asian 
emigrants return to their home countries while they still belong to the labor force. Thus, 
return migration increases the average level of human capital together with the initial 
incentive effect and is a significant determinant of the productivity growth. As a result of 
return migration, brain drain could have positive effects even on a larger group of 
countries than assessed based on this analysis. All in all, brain drain is a meaningful factor 
in inducing incentives to acquire education and should not be ignored as an education 
policy instrument in developing countries. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
Derivation of equation 0Å. Å1  
The net return to physical capital is determined by the marginal product of capital, i.e. by 
the derivative of the production function with respect to the stock of physical capital. 
Because the production function can be written as 
 
, = /0, 1 = :01 = : 3 4565759 ,                                                                 011 
 
the net return to physical capital is given by  
 
# = IJ5I45 = :m 3 4565759 3 ]65759  = :m01.                                                                            021        
 
Derivation of equation 0Å. Æ1 
The wage rate per efficiency unit of labor is given by the marginal product of labor. Thus, 
the wage rate can be defined by differentiating the production function with respect to 
the total amount of efficiency units of labor. Because the production function is 
determined as given in the equation 011, the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor is 
 
' = IJ5I75 = :m01 3− 456575i9 + :01 =  y3− 4565759 :m01 + :01z  
= K:01 − :′01M.                                                                                                            031 
 
By defining '01 ≡ :01 − :′01, the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor can be 
written as ' = '01.                                                                                                                              
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Derivation of equations 0Å. È1 and 0Å. É1 
Using the fact that  = 0b]1, Y can be written as 
 
Y = 65Z0D1[\0][^∗165Z0D1 = 1 + \0][^
∗1
60g5ef1Z0D1.                                                                                     041 
 
Differentiation of Y with respect to b]thus results in 
 
IdY5Ig5ef = − \0][^
∗16h0g5ef16i0g5ef1Z0D1 .                                                                                                            051 
 
Because  = r P01RSdY5 =D0O1 −DkYl, where D is an integrated function of P, it 
follows that 
 
Ig5Ig5ef = −PkYl IdY5Ig5ef = PkYl \0][^
∗16h0g5ef16i0g5ef1Z0D1 .                                                                       061 
 
Derivation of equation 0Å. ÊÅ1 
The proportion of educated individuals is given by the equation 02.111 as 
 
 = 0]bq1r s0dt1Idtuvw5]bq3r s0dt1Idtuvw5 9 =
r s0dt1Idtbq3r s0dt1Idtuvw5 9uvw5 ]bq3r s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
.                                                                  071 
 
The differentiation of the average proportion of educated individuals with respect to the 
emigration possibility  thus gives 
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Ig5Iq =
bskdY5lËvw5ËÁbr s0dt1IdtbqskdY5lËvw5ËÁuvw5 3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i   
− 3r s0dt1Idtbqr s0dt1Idt
uvw5
uvw5 9br s0dt1IdtbqskdY5lËvw5ËÁuvw5 
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i  
= bskdY5lËvw5ËÁ[qskdY5lËvw5ËÁ r s0dt1Idtbr s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw5 [qr s0dt1Idt r s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw53]bqr s0dt1IdtÌvw5 9i   
+ qskdY5lËvw5ËÁbqiskdY5lËvw5ËÁ r s0dt1Idtuvw53]bqr s0dt1IdtÌvw5 9i          
− br s0dt1Idt r s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw5 [qskdY5lËvw5ËÁ r s0dt1Idtuvw5 [qr s0dt1Idtuvw5 r s0dt1Idtuvw5 bqiskdY5lËvw5ËÁ r s0dt1Idtuvw53]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i   
= bskdY5lËvw5ËÁbr s0dt1Idtuvw5 [qskdY5lËvw5ËÁ[r s0dt1Idt r s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw53]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i  
= − r s0dt1Idtbr s0dt1Idtuvw5 r s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw5 3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i −
skdY5lËvw5ËÁbqskdY5lËvw5ËÁ
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i   
= − r s0dt1Idtuvw5 3]br s0dt1Idtuvw5 93]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i −
0]bq1skdY5l
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i xdY5xq .                                                            081          
 
Because 
 
xg5xq = br s0dt1Idt3]bqr s0dt1Idt
uvw5 9b3r s0dt1Idtbqr s0dt1Idtuvw5uvw5 93br s0dt1Idtuvw5 9uvw5
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i   
= − r s0dt1Idtuvw5 3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 br s0dt1Idtuvw5 [qr s0dt1Idtuvw5 93]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i   
= − r s0dt1Idtuvw5 3]br s0dt1Idtuvw5 93]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i                                                                                                      091 
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and 
 
xg5xdY5 =
0]bq1bskdY5lÂvw5Âvw53]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9b0]bq1r s0dt1Idtuvw5 bqbskdY5lÂv
w5Âvw5
3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9
i   
= 0]bq13bskdY5l[qskdY5l r s0dt1Idtuvw5 9b0]bq13qskdY5l9r s0dt1Idtuvw53]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i   
= b0]bq1skdY5l[0]bq1qskdY5l r s0dt1Idtuvw5 b0]bq1qskdY5l r s0dt1Idtuvw53]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i   
= − 0]bq1skdY5l3]bqr s0dt1Idtuvw5 9i,                                                                                                                0101 
 
Ig5Iq  can be written as 
 
 
Ig5Iq = xg5xq + xg5xdY5 xdY5xq ,                                                                                                                   0111 
 
where Y is given by the equation 02.101 and 
 
xdY5xq = − k65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z10qZ∗b0]bq165Z1i .                                                                                                0121 
 
Determination of Proposition 1 
According to the equation 02.161 
 
skdY5lk65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1065Z1i > r P01R 31 − r P01RSdY5 9SdY5 . 
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A function Í can be determined as Í ≡ r P01R 31 − r P01RSdY5 9SdY5 . By denoting + ≡ r P01RSdY5 , the function Í becomes Í = +01 − +1 = + − +a. Now the 
maximization of the function Í results in 
 
IÎ
Iµ = 1 − 2+ = 0	 ⇔ + = r P01RSdY5 = ]a. 
 
Because 
 
IiÎ
Iµi = −2 < 0 , 
 
this is a maximum point. Thus, the maximum value of the function Í is  
 
Í 3]a9 = ]a 31 − ]a9 = ]~  
 
and consequently the condition of the equation 02.161 becomes 
 
skdY5lk65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z1065Z1i > ]~.                                                                                               0131 
 
Derivation of equation 0Å. ÊÈ1 
Assuming that the density function P01 follows the uniform distribution, it has the 
following properties: P01 = ]S and r P01R = 1 − dY5SSdY5 . Given these properties, the 
condition for beneficial brain drain now becomes: 
Ig5Iq > 0  
⇔	 xg5xq < xg5xdY5 xdY5xq   
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⇔	 ]b
vw5u ]b]bvw5u 
]bq]bvw5u 
i < 0]bq13fu9]bq]bvw5u i
k65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z10qZ∗[0]bq165Z1i   
⇔	31 − dY5S9 3dY5S9 < 01 − 1 3]S9 k65Z[\0][^∗1l0Z∗b65Z10qZ∗[0]bq165Z1i   
⇔ 1− dY5S < 01 − 1 3 ]dY59 k65Z[\0][^
∗1l0Z∗b65Z10qZ∗[0]bq165Z1i   
⇔ 1− dY5S < 01 − 1 3qZ∗[0]bq165Z65Z[\0][^∗1 9 k65Z[\0][^
∗1l0Z∗b65Z10qZ∗[0]bq165Z1i   
⇔ 1− dY5S < 01 − 1 Z∗b65ZqZ∗[0]bq165Z.                                                                                         0141 
 
Appendix B 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. Ï1 
Solving  from the equation 03.31 results in 
 
!∗ = b]ℎ]b 
⟺	b] = !∗b]b]ℎb]                                                             
⟺	 = !∗ fef fef efef efefℎefef  
⇔	 = 35∗565 9
fef ℎ .                                                                                                                 0O11 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. Ð1 
By inserting the equation 03.51 into the equation 03.21, - becomes 
 
- = ℎ]b = 0!∗ fef fef efef efefℎ1ℎ]b = !∗ ef ef eef eefℎℎ]b  
     =  efef!∗ ef ef eefℎ =  ffe!∗ efe efe feℎ = 3 655∗59
ffe ℎ.                   0O21                                                                
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Derivation of equation 0Æ. Ñ1 
By inserting the equation 03.51 into the equation 03.41, ' becomes 
 
' = 01 − 1ℎb = 01 − 1 3!∗ fef fef efef efefℎ9 ℎb  
      = 01 − 1!∗ ef ef eef eefℎℎb = 01 − 1 efef!∗ ef ef eef  
      = 01 − 1 ffe!∗ efe efe fe = 01 − 1 3 655∗59
ffe
.                                              0O31                          
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÊÏ1 
By inserting the price of an intermediate input   given in equation 03.141 into the 
producer´s maximization problem, the maximization problem of a producer  becomes 
maxt,5 k, , −  ,l = maxt.5 k,]b ,b] , −  ,l = maxt,5 k,]b , −  ,l. 
 
The solution of the maximization problem, which determines the demanded amount of 
input  in equilibrium, is given as 
 
Ik6t,5fet,5 bt,5lIt,5 = a,]b ,b] − 1 = 0  
⇔	a,]b ,b] = 1  
⇔	 ,b] = ]i6t,5fe  
⇔	 , =  ]i6t,5fe
fef =  ife,.                                                                                            0O41 
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Derivation of equations 0Æ. ÅÆ1, 0Æ. ÅÒ1 and 0Æ. ÅÏ1  
The maximization problem of a producer is given by 
 
max),5,),5,(,5,(,5 &,,]b01 − b]1 + &,,]bb]b]∗ − . 
 
From the maximization problem, a function Ó can be defined as 
 
Ók&,, &,, ,, ,l = &,,]b01 − b]1 + &,,]bb]b]∗  
 −'),k&, + &,l + '(,k, + ,lb]∗ ,                                             0O51 
 
where b] ≡ b] b]∗⁄ . The differentiation of the function Ó with respect to &, and 
&,, the amounts of unskilled labor demanded in imitation and innovation sectors, gives 
 
IÔ
I),5 = &,b],]b01 − b]1b]∗ − '),b]∗ = 0                                             0O61           
                   
and 
 
IÔ
I),5 = &,b],]bb]b]∗ − '),b]∗ = 0.                                                        0O71 
 
From the equation 0O71  '),  can be solved to be 
 
&,b],]bb]b]∗ − '),b]∗ = 0 
⟺	'),b]∗ = &,b],]bb]b]∗  
⟺	'), = &,b],]bb].                                                                                       0O81 
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Inserting the value of '), in the equation 0O81 into the equation 0O61 results in 
 
&,b],]b01 − b]1b]∗ = 	&,b],]bb]b]∗  
⟺ 	&,b],]b01 − b]1 = &,b],]bb].                                                 0O91 
 
Because &, = % − &, and , =  − ,, equation 0O91 can be rewritten as 
 
&,b],]b01 − b]1 = k% − &,lb]k − ,l]bb].                            0O101                   
 
On the other hand, differentiating the function Ó with respect to ,  and , , the 
amounts of educated workers demanded in imitation and innovation sectors, gives 
 
IÔ
I(,5 = 01 − 1&,,b01 − b]1b]∗ − '(,b]∗ = 0                                     0O111                   
                                          
and 
 
IÔ
I(,5 = 01 − 1&,,bb]b]∗ − '(,b]∗ = 0.                                                 0O121      
 
Again, '(, can be solved from the equation 0O121 to be 
 
01 − 1&,,bb]b]∗ − '(,b]∗ = 0 
⟺	'(,b]∗ = 01 − 1&,,bb]b]∗  
⟺	'(, = 01 − 1&,,bb].                                                                                0O131 
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Now, inserting the value of '(, in the equation 0O131 into the equation 0O111, results in 
 
01 − 1&,,b01 − b]1b]∗ = 01 − 1&,,bb]b]∗  
⟺	01 − 1&,,b01 − b]1 = 01 − 1&,,bb].                                    0O141 
 
As before, equation 0O141 can be rewritten as 
 
01 − 1&,,b01 − b]1 = 01 − 1k% − &,lk − ,lbb].                 0O151        
 
Equations 0O101 and 0O151 are the first order conditions for an interior solution of the 
producer’s maximization problem. For simplicity, the time indices can be ignored and, 
thus, the equations can be written as  
 
&b]]b01 − 1 = 0% − &1b]0 − 1]b                                                 0O161 
 
and 
 
01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 10% − &10 − 1b.                                     0O171 
 
If both of the equations are divided by their right hand sides, it follows that 
)¦ef(fe¦0]b§1¨0 b)1©ef0¡b(1fe©§ = 1  
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and 
 
0]b1)¦(e¦0]b§10]b1¨0 b)1©0¡b(1e©§ = 1. 
 
By combining these equations, it can be found out that 
 
)¦ef(fe¦0]b§1¨0 b)1©ef0¡b(1fe©§ = 0]b1)
¦(e¦0]b§10]b1¨0 b)1©0¡b(1e©§  
⟺ 	&b]]b01 − 101 − 10% − &10 − 1b 
       = 01 − 1&b01 − 10% − &1b]0 − 1]b 
⟺ 	&b]]b01 − 10% − &10 − 1b 
        = 01 − 1&b0% − &1b]0 − 1]b 
⟺ 	01 − 10% − &1 = 01 − 1&0 − 1.                                                         0O181 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÅÈ1 
From the equation 03.251 it can be solved that 
 
01 − 10% − &1 = 01 − 1&0 − 1 
⟺ 	01 − 1% − 01 − 1& = 01 − 1&0 − 1 
⟺ 	01 − 1% = 01 − 10 − 1& + 01 − 1& 
⇔	 0]b10]b1 % = 0]b10]b1 0 − 1& + 0]b10]b1 &  
⟺ 0]b10]b1 	% = y0]b10]b1 0 − 1 + 0]b10]b1 z &  
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⟺	& = ¦
0fe©10fe¦1© (0fe¦1©0fe¦1©0¡b(1[¦0fe©10fe¦1©( =
¤ (¡b([¤( = ¤ (¡[0¤b]1(,                                               0O191  
 
where £ ≡ 0]b10]b1 > 1. 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÅÉ1 
Using the fact that & = ¤ (¡[0¤b]1(, the equation 03.241 becomes 
 
01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 10% − &10 − 1b 
⇔	01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 1&b 
⇔	01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 1 3)(9
   
⇔	01 − 1&b01 − 1 = 01 − 1 3 )¤(9
   
⇔	01 − 1 3 ¤ (¡[0¤b]1(9
 3 ](9
 01 − 1 = 01 − 1 3 ¤ (¡[0¤b]1(9
 3 ]¤(9
   
⇔	01 − 1 3 ¤ ¡[0¤b]1(9
 01 − 1 = 01 − 1 3  ¡[0¤b]1(9
   
⇔	01 − 1f¦ 3 ¤ ¡[0¤b]1(9 01 − 1
f¦ = f¦01 − 1f¦ 3  ¡[0¤b]1(9
©¦ f¦  
⇔	£ 3  ¡[0¤b]1(9
]b©¦ 30]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦ = 1  
⇔ 	£ 3  ¡[0¤b]1(9
¦e©¦ 30]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦ = 1  
⇔	£ ¦¦e© 3  ¡[0¤b]1(9 30]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦e© = 1  
⇔	3  ¡[0¤b]1(9 3¤
¦0]b10]b§1
¨0]b1§ 9
f¦e© = 1  
⇔ %3¤¦0]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦e© =  + 0£ − 11  
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⇔	0£ − 11 = % 3¤¦0]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦e© − .                                                                         0O201                     
 
Denoting ¥01 ≡ 3¤¦0]b10]b§1¨0]b1§ 9
f¦e©
, function 0O201 can be written as 
 
0£ − 11 = ¥01% − .                                                                                                        0O211 
 
By taking a logarithm of ¥01, it becomes 
 
lnk¥01l = ]b yln 3¤¦0]b1¨0]b1 9 + ln01 − 1 − ln01z .                                                         
 
Now, the differentiation of lnk¥01l with respect to  gives 
 
I ÕÖk«0§1l
I§ = ]b 3− ]]b§ − ]§9.                                                                                                   0O221 
 
Because  <  and 0 <  < 1, the derivative of lnk¥01l with respect to  is negative. 
Consequently, also the derivative of ¥01 with respect to  is negative. 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÅÑ1 
For an interior solution to exist, it must be that  ≤  and  ≤ . From the equation 
03.281 it can be obtained that  = «0§1 b¡¤b] . As a consequence,  =  −  =  −
«0§1 b¡
¤b] = ¡¤b¡b«0§1 [¡¤b] = ¡¤b«0§1 ¤b] . 
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Now, the inequalities can be solved: 
 
 ≤  
⟺	 «0§1 b¡¤b] ≤   
⟺ ¥01% −  ≤ £ −   
⟺	 «0§1¤ ≤ ¡                                                                                                                                 0O231 
 
and 
 
 ≤  
⟺	 ¡¤b«0§1 ¤b] ≤   
⟺ £ − ¥01% ≤ £ −  
⟺	 ¡  ≤ ¥01.                                                                                                                             0O241 
 
By combining the equations 0O231 and 0O241, the following condition for the relative 
factor endowments can be obtained:  
 
«0§1
¤ ≤ ¡  ≤ ¥01.                                                                                                                        0O251 
 
Derivation of equations 0Æ. Æ×1 and 0Æ. ÆÊ1 
Inserting  = «0§1 b¡¤b]  into the equation 03.271 results in 
 
& = ¤ (¡[0¤b]1( =
¤ 3Ø0Ù1ÚeÌÛef 9
¡[0¤b]13Ø0Ù1ÚeÌÛef 9 = 3
¤ i«0§1b¤ ¡
¤b] 9 3 ]«0§1 9 = 3¤0 «0§1b¡1¤b] 9 3 ]«0§19  
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      = 3¤0¤b]1(¤b] 9 ]«0§1 = ¤(«0§1 
⇔	 )( = ¤«0§1.                                                                                                                             0O261 
 
Because £ )( = )( , as stated in the equation 03.261,  
 
)( = 3]¤9 3)(9 = 3]¤9 3 ¤«0§19 = ]«0§1.                                                                                      0O271 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÆÅ1 
The growth rate in period 
 is given by  
 
° = r 6t,5b65ef65ef R = ]65ef r ,R]F − 1]F ,  
 
where  , = ,b] + &,,,,]b0b]∗ − b]1 + &,,,,]bb] according 
to equation 03.181. Because b] represents the country´s productivity frontier at the 
end of period 
 − 1, it is defined as b] = r ,b]R]F . The growth rate in period 
 can 
thus be written as 
 
° = ]65ef r ,b]R + ²65ef r &,,	,,]b0b]∗ − b]1]F]F R  
     + ²¨65ef r &,,,,]bb]R − 1]F  
     = 1 + ²65ef r &,,	,,]b0b]∗ − b]1]F R +  r &,,,,]bR − 1]F  
     = ²65ef r &,,	,,]b0b]∗ − b]1]F R +  r &,,,,]bR]F .                 0O281 
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At the steady state b] = b]∗  and, therefore, the first term on the right-hand side of 
the equation 0O281 vanishes. On the other hand, because of the symmetry of the 
industries also the  and 
 subscripts can be ignored at the steady state and the growth 
rate becomes 
 
° = &]b .                                                                                                                      0O291 
 
Because & = ¤ (¡[0¤b]1( and  = «0§1 b¡¤b]  according to the equations 03.271 and 03.281 
and, in addition,  =  +  and % = & + & in equilibrium, the values of  and & 
can be calculated to be 
 
 =  −  =  − «0§1 b¡¤b] = ¡0¤b]1b«0§1 [¡¤b] = ¤¡b«0§1 ¤b]                                               0O301 
 
and 
 
& = % − & = % − ¤ (¡[0¤b]1( =  ¡[ 0¤b]1(b¤ (¡[0¤b]1( =  ¡b (¡[0¤b]1( =  (¡[0¤b]1(.     0O311                              
 
Now, the growth rate of the economy can be calculated to be 
 
° = &]b  
    =  3  (¡[0¤b]1(9
 ]b  
    =    ¡[0¤b]13Ø0Ù1ÚeÌÛef 9
  
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    =  3  ¡[«0§1 b¡9 3¤¡b«0§1 ¤b] 9 
    = ¥01b 3¤¡b«0§1 ¤b] 9.                                                                                                      0O321                                                                       
  
From the equation 0O321 it follows that 
 
° = ¥01b 3¤¡b«0§1 ¤b] 9  
⇔	 ±²¨ = ¤¤b] ¥01b − ]¤b] ¥01]b%.                                                                               0O331  
 
Because £ ≡ 0]b10]b1  and as a consequence £ − 1 = 0]b10]b1 − 0]b10]b1 = bb[0]b1 =
b
0]b1, equation 0O331 becomes 
 
±
²¨ = 30]b10]b19 30]b1b 9 ¥01b − 30]b1b 9 ¥01]b%  
⇔	 ±²¨ = 30]b1b 9 ¥01b − 30]b1b 9 ¥01]b%  
⇔	 ±²¨ = ]b K01 − 1¥01b − 01 − 1¥01]b%M.                                                  0O341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÆÒ1 
Because ¥01 = 30]b1¤¦0]b§10]b1¨§ 9
f¦e©
, the derivative of ¥01 with respect to  is given by 
I«0§1
I§ = 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© IÜ3
feÙÙ 9
f¦e©Ý
I§   
          = 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© y− 3 ]b9 01 − 1 f¦e©b]b f¦e© + 01 − 1 f¦e© 3− ]b9b f¦e©b]z 
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© y01 − 1 f¦e©b f¦e©001 − 1b] + b]1z         
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© y01 − 1 f¦e©b f¦e© 3 §§0]b§1+ ]b§§0]b§19z 
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© y01 − 1 f¦e©b f¦e© 3 ]§0]b§19z 
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© 01 − 1fe¦³©¦e© bfe¦³©¦e©  
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© 3]b§§ 9
fe¦³©¦e©
   
          = 3− ]b9 30]b1¤¦0]b1¨ 9
f¦e© 3]§ − 19
fe¦³©¦e©
                                                                         0O351 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÆÐ1 
An individual’s utility function is given by 
 
%0+, 	$[]1 = ln0' − 	 − +'1+ 01 − 1 ln0'[]01 + +1 − $[]1 +  ln0$[]![a∗ 1, 
 
as in the equation 03.351. By maximizing the utility function with respect to the savings in 
period 
 + 1, savings become a constant fraction  of the second period income: 
70 
 
 
I 0µ5,¶5³f1I¶5³f = − ]b·Z5³f0][µ5¸1b¶5³f + ![a∗ ·¶5³f5³i∗ = 0  
⟺	 ]b·Z5³f0][µ5¸1b¶5³f = ·¶5³f  
⟺	$[]01 − 1 = 0'[]01 + +1 − $[]1  
⟺	$[] − $[] = k'[]01 + +1l − $[] 
⟺	$[] = k'[]01 + +1l.                                                                                               0O361 
 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. ÆÈ1 
Because  $[] = k'[]01 + +1l, as shown by the equation 0O361, the utility function 
given in the equation 03.351 can be rewritten as 
 
%0+, $[]1 = % 3+, k'[]01 + +1l9 
= ln0' − 	 − +'1 + 01 − 1 lnk'[]01 + +1 − '[]01 + +1l 
    + ln0'[]01 + +1![a∗ 1 
= ln0' − 	 − +'1 + 01 − 1 lnk01 − 1'[]01 + +1l 
    + ln0'[]01 + +1![a∗ 1 
= ln0' − 	 − +'1 + 01 − 1 ln01 − 1 + 01 − 1 lnk'[]01 + +1l 
    + ln01 +  lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 
= ln0' − 	 − +'1 + 01 − 1 ln01 − 1 + lnk'[]01 + +1l 
    − lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln01 +  lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 
= ln0' − 	 − +'1 + lnk'[]01 + +1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 +  ln01 
    +01 − 1 ln01 − 1.                                                                                                             0O371 
 
 
71 
 
Derivation of equation 0Æ. Ò×1 
When deciding whether to invest in education, an individual compares his expected life 
time utility with and without an educational investment. If the expected utility with 
education exceeds the utility without education, that is º011 > º001, it is profitable for 
an individual to invest in education. Solving the inequality gives the critical value for the 
cost of education as  
 
º011 > º001 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 + lnk'[]01 + 1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹ 
       > ln0' − 	 1 + ln0'[]1 +  ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹ 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 + ln0'[]1 + ln01 + 1 > ln0' − 	 1 + ln0'[]1 
⟺	lnk01 + 10' − 	 − '1l > ln0' − 	 1 
⟺	' − 	 − ' + ' − 	 − ' > ' − 	  
⟺ 	0' − 	 1 > 01 + 1' 
⟺	3 ¸][¸9 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9 > .                                                                                                            0O381 
 
Appendix C 
 
Derivation of equation 0Ò. Æ1 
The critical value for the cost of education can again be found out by solving the 
inequality º011 > º001 . However, a high skilled individual must now take into 
consideration that with a possibility  he will receive a wage '[]∗ in the second period of 
his life. Hereby, the utility function of an educated individual is modified into the form 
 
º011 = ln0' − 	 − '1 + 01 − 1 lnk'[]01 + 1l +  lnk'[]∗ 01 + 1l 
+ ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹ 
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as in the equation 04.21. The utility function of an uneducated individual remains the 
same as before in section 3.3. The critical value for the cost of education with the 
emigration possibility for educated individuals now becomes 
 
º011 > º001 
⟺ ln0' − 	 − '1 + 01 − 1 lnk'[]01 + 1l +  lnk'[]∗ 01 + 1l +  ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹ 
      > ln0' − 	 1 + ln0'[]1 +  ln0![a∗ 1 + ¹ 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 + 01 − 1 ln0'[]1 + 01 − 1 ln01 + 1 +  ln0'[]∗ 1 
     + ln01 + 1 > ln0' − 	 1 + ln0'[]1 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 + ln0'[]1 −  ln0'[]1 + ln01 + 1 −  ln01 + 1 +  ln0'[]∗ 1 
     + ln01 + 1 > ln0' − 	 1 + ln0'[]1 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 −  ln0'[]1 + ln01 + 1 +  ln0'[]∗ 1 > ln0' − 	 1 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 − ln0'[]q1 + ln01 + 1 + ln00'[]∗ 1q1 > ln0' − 	 1 
⟺	ln0' − 	 − '1 − ln0' − 	 1 > ln0'[]q1 − ln00'[]∗ 1q1 − ln01 + 1 
⟺	ln 3Z5b»5¼b\Z5Z5b»5¼ 9 > ln  Z5³f
Á
kZ5³f∗ lÁ − ln01 + 1  
⟺	ln3Z5b»5¼Z5b»5¼9 − \Z5Z5b»5¼ > ln0[]q1 − ln01 + 1  
⟺	ln 31 − \Z5Z5b»5¼9 > ln 3½5³f
Á
][¸ 9  
⟺ 1− \Z5Z5b»5¼ > ½5³f
Á
][¸   
⟺	− \Z5Z5b»5¼ > ½5³f
Á
][¸ − 1  
⟺	−' > 3½5³fÁ][¸ − 19 0' − 	 1  
⟺	− > 3½5³fÁ][¸ − 19 3Z5b»5¼Z5 9  
⟺  < 31 − ½5³fÁ][¸ 9 31 − »Z5∗Z5 9  
⟺  < 31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9.                                                                                                   011 
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The proof of equation 0Ò. Ï1 
The proportion of individuals acquiring education is higher with the possibility of 
emigration for highly skilled individuals than without the possibility of emigration because 
comparing equations 03.421 and 04.41 gives 
 
31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9 > 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9  
⟺	 ][¸][¸ − ½5³fÁ][¸ > ¸][¸  
⟺ 1+  − []q >  
⟺ 1−[]q > 0.                                                                                                                      021 
 
Equation 021 is valid with all [] < 1 and 0 <  < 1. 
 
Derivation of equation 0Ò. Ð1 
By differentiating the proportion of highly skilled individuals staying in the source country 
of emigration with respect to the emigration possibility, it can be seen that the average 
level of human capital depends on  in the following way: 
 
Ig5³fIq =
0b]1\5	[0]bq1ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ0]bq\5	 1bÜ0b]1\5	bqÂÃ5¼ÂÁ0]bq1\5	Ý
0]bq\5	 1i   
 
          = 3b\5	[0]bq1
ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 90]bq\5	 1b3b\5	bqÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 90\5	bq\5	 1
0]bq\5	 1i  
 
          = b\5	 0]bq\5	 1[0]bq1
ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 0]bq\5	 1bb\5	 0\5	bq\5	 1bqÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 0\5	bq\5	 1
0]bq\5	 1i  
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          = b\5	[q\5	 i[3ÂÃ5¼ÂÁbqÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 90]bq\5	 1b3b\5	 i[q\5	 ibq\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ[qi\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ 90]bq\5	 1i  
 
          = b\5	[q\5	 i[ÂÃ5¼ÂÁbqÂÃ5¼ÂÁbq\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ[qi\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ[\5	 ibq\5	 i[q\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁbqi\5	 ÂÃ5¼ÂÁ0]bq\5	 1i  
 
          = ÂÃ5¼ÂÁbqÂÃ5¼ÂÁb\5	[\5	 i0]bq\5	 1i =
0]bq1ÂÃ5¼ÂÁb\5	 0]b\5	 10]bq\5	 1i .                                                        031 
 
Derivation of equation 0Ò. É1 
The derivative of the average level of human capital in the source country of emigration 
with respect to the emigration possibility at  = 0 is given by 
 
Ig5³fIq |q|F = I\5	Iq − 	01 − 	1. 
 
Because 
 
	 = 31 − »½59 31 − ½5³f
Á
][¸ 9  
 
and 
 
I\5	Iq = 31 − »½59 3− ]][¸9[]q ln[], 
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the derivative of the average level of human capital with respect to the emigration 
possibility is positive at  = 0 if and only if  
 
31 − »½59 3− ln[] ]][¸9 > 31 − »½59 31 − ]][¸9 y1 − 31 − »½59 31 − ]][¸9z  
⟺	− ln[] ]][¸ > 3 ¸][¸9 y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z  
⟺	− ln[] >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z  
⟺	− lnZ5³fZ5³f∗ >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z  
⟺	−0ln'[] − ln'[]∗ 1 >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z  
⟺	ln'[]∗ − ln'[] >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z	  
⟺	ln 3Z5³f∗Z5³f9 >  y1 − 31 − »½59 3 ¸][¸9z.                                                                                 041 
 
